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Abstract: We analyze general equilibrium relationships between trade policy
and the household distribution of income, decomposing social welfare into real
income level and variance components through Gini and Atkinson indexes. We
embed these inequality-adjusted social welfare functions in a general equilibrium
structure mapping from tariff protection to household inequality. This yields pre-
dictions regarding the linkages between trade protection, country characteristics
and inequality in Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardo-Viner frameworks. In addition,
we can separate the efficiency and equity effects of tariffs on welfare. We then
examine endogenous tariff formation when policy makers care about both equity
and special interests.
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1 Introduction
There has been widespread interest in the policy community in the distributional effects of
trade liberalization. Recent anti-globalization rhetoric has focused on the potential negative
impact of trade and outsourcing for unskilled wages in developed countries, while arguing
that it may also hurt workers in poor countries. On the other hand, many economists regard
trade liberalization as an instrument for increasing growth, but are less certain about the
distributional effects of increased openness.
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Driven in large part by continued policy interest, the relationship between trade openness
and wages has also been an active topic of debate in the research community.1 However,
this literature focuses on the functional distribution of income, with less emphasis on house-
hold distribution issues.2 The current literature has stressed theoretical linkages based on
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. In this context, tariff reductions in poor labor-abundant
countries are expected to increase the real income of workers and hurt capital owners (or
skilled labor). In developed countries the opposite effect is expected. The empirical evidence
remains mixed and somewhat contradictory.
In this paper, we follow Bourguignon and Morrisson (1989, 1990) and Spilimbergo et al.
(1999) and use an ownership matrix that allows us to move from functional to household
income. We then obtain a general function of the personal income distribution in terms
of endowments, tariffs and the ownership structure. Using this analytical framework, we
analyze the impact of trade and tariffs on the household distribution of income in general
equilibrium.
Treating equity issues as relevant, we work with Sen-type social welfare functions (Sen,
1974) and embed inequality indexes in social welfare indexes. In particular, we work with the
widely used Gini coefficient and with the Atkinson family of inequality indexes (Atkinson,
1970), although other indexes may be employed. Using this framework we are able to decom-
pose the general equilibrium import protection effects into real income level and dispersion
changes.
The efficiency properties of tariffs are well developed in the literature. What we highlight
here is how distributional aspects of social welfare related to import protection may be
examined alongside efficiency aspects. For government, this is manifested not only in special
interest politics, but also through the direct impact of inequality on a government’s objective
function. We find that equity considerations may serve to counter lobbying interests in both
capital-rich and capital-poor countries, though with opposite marginal impact on the final
policy outcome. Although we focus our attention only on import tariffs, the main message
that follows from this approach can be applied in a more general context of trade policy
instruments. The precise distributional and efficiency components may change, but in essence
the trade-off and interrelation between both economic outcomes is still present.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a formal representation of social
1Comprehensive surveys are provided by Richardson (1995), Cline (1997) and Feenstra and Hanson (2004).
2Recent papers include Edwards (1997), Higgins and Williamson (1999), Barro (2000) and Spilimbergo et
al. (2001).
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welfare inclusive of income inequality. In Section 3, we embed this social welfare function
into a general equilibrium trade model. We also develop the equilibrium representation of
inequality, based on the general equilibrium system fundamentals. Section 4 then explores
linkages between trade policy, inequality, and welfare. It also examines theoretical linkages
between country size, development, policy, and inequality. In Section 5, we explore the
implications of the addition of inequality to the social welfare component of a government’s
objective function for political support function models of tariff formation. We conclude in
Section 6.
2 Defining social welfare with respect to inequality
Our goal in this section is to develop a functional linkage between inequality and aggregate
(social) welfare. This will then be integrated in the next section into a dual general equilib-
rium trade model. A critical condition for inequality to have a meaningful link to aggregate
(social) welfare is that the utility function be strictly concave with respect to income. Ad-
ditionally, for tractability we prefer to work with a social welfare function that is symmetric
and additively separable in individual incomes.
The existence of social welfare functions depends crucially on the possibility to compare
interpersonal utility levels. One such possibility is offered by the ‘veil of ignorance’ approach
first proposed by Harsanyi (1953, 1955) and further developed by Rawls (1971), where we
rank different individual situations not knowing which would be the actual situation. As
stated by Sen (1997) this interpersonal comparison can be defined as those situations where
we make judgements of the type:
”I would prefer to be person A rather than person B in this situation” and ”while
we do not really have the opportunity (or perhaps the misfortune, as the case
may be) of in fact becoming A or B, we can think quite systematically about such
a choice, and indeed we seem to make such comparisons frequently”.
Because GDP per capita is the most common indicator of social welfare, the ‘veil of
ignorance’ approach supports the use of an inequality measure to complement GDP per
capita comparisons. If we do not know which individual household we are in a specific country,
then the expected utility becomes a function of mean income and the personal distribution
of income. How we evaluate the probability of receiving any given income is then determined
by the functional representation of the utility function and more specifically by the degree
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of concavity of this function. In this context, a natural extension of cross-country welfare
comparisons is to complement GDP per capita levels with some measure of inequality.3
Under the social welfare approach to income distribution measurement, inequality is as-
sociated with variance in the distribution of income. This raises two measurement problems.
The first is that we cannot generally rely on first moment-based indicators. The second is that
even though the concepts of Lorenz-dominance and General Lorenz-dominance (Shorrocks,
1983) are accepted as ways to impartially rank two different distributions4, in many cases the
Lorenz-curves intersect at least once, so that we obtain incomplete ranking of distributions.
To solve both these problems, inequality indexes are usually used to rank distributions in
indeterminate cases and to provide a summary variable that can be used in empirical mod-
els. While the most commonly used is the Gini coefficient, most inequality measures are
implicitly based on a social welfare function (Dalton, 1920; Kolm, 1969; Atkinson,1970). As
such, there is no perfect index, and any index has built in social preferences.
In this paper, we employ two representations of household utility and social welfare. Both
reflect Sen’s (1974) preferred definition of social welfare as:
SW = y (1− I) (1)
where SW is the social welfare, y is mean income, and I is an index of inequality.
Starting with CRRA preferences yields the well-known Atkinson inequality index directly
as a natural metric for a mapping from income distribution to social welfare (see Atkinson
1970). In this sense, Atkinson’s index fits naturally into Sen’s proposed social welfare func-
tion.
Sen actually offered equation (1) as defined with respect to the Gini coefficient. In this
case, the social welfare function is axiomatic, in that we do not have an obvious mapping
–through aggregation– from individual preferences to an aggregate social welfare function.
This follows because the social welfare function is then rank sensitive. We work with both
the Atkinson index and Gini coefficient in this paper.
2.1 The Atkinson index-based social welfare function
Formally, we define a composite consumer good over the range of all consumption goods,
which follows from a linear homothetic aggregation function. As such, cost minimization
yields a composite consumer price index. This is defined over all consumer prices pc.
3This approach was formally treated by Sen (1976).
4See Lambert (1993) for details.
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pc = f (p) (2)
Household utility uh is defined as a function of household consumption of the composite
consumer good ch:
uh = ψ
(
ch
)
(3)
We next map aggregate individual utility to aggregate welfare φ, which is defined as the
sum of household utility,
φ =
∑
h
uh (4)
while aggregate consumption c is the sum of household consumption.
c =
∑
h
ch (5)
We will assume that the function ψ is CRRA:5
ψ
(
ch
)
=

(ch)1−θ
1−θ if θ 6= 1
ln ch if θ = 1
(6)
In general, we assume that θ > 0, and in this paper we focus on the case where θ 6= 1.6
We employ a simple linear transformation, and are then able to define a social welfare index
in per-capita terms.
SWA =
φ
n (1− φ) =
1
n
∑
h
(
ch
)1−θ
(7)
Simple manipulation then yields social welfare as a function of per-capita income y,
consumer prices, and income equality.
SWA =
(
y
pc
)1−θ
E1−θA (8)
With some further manipulation, our equality measure EA can be mapped directly to
the Atkinson index of income inequality, yielding a Sen-type social welfare function. In
particular, taking the definition of the Atkinson index (Atkinson, 1970), we have the following
relationships between the Atkinson index IA, EA, and social welfare.
5In the present context, constant relative inequality aversion (CRIA) is a better label and acronym.
6One gets the same basic results with log preferences. Estimates in the macro literature are that θ is less
than 1.
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IA = 1−
(
1
n
∑
h
(
yh
y
)1−θ) 11−θ
= 1− EA (9)
SWA =
[(
y
pc
)
(1− IA)
]1−θ
(10)
Note that as θ → 0 only average income matters, rather than income inequality. Alter-
natively, when θ → ∞, then SWA = min
(
yh
)
and we have the extreme Rawlsian maximin
social welfare function, were the income level of the poorest individual is the only relevant
variable and average income is unimportant. Moreover, for a given distribution (measured
as shares of total income) we have declining marginal utility of income.
2.2 The Gini index-based social welfare function
The Gini coefficient is defined as twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree
line. As such, (1−G) is then twice the area below the Lorenz curve. Formally, this index is
defined as follows:
IG = 1 +
1
n
− 2
n2y
(
y1 + 2y2 + ...+ nyn
)
= 1 +
1
n
−
[(
2
n2
∑
h
hyh
y
)]
(11)
SWG =
[(
y
pc
)
(1− IG)
]
(12)
where we have arranged households so that y1 ≥ y2 ≥ ... ≥ yn. Unlike the Atkinson-
based social welfare function, the Gini-based social welfare function embodies asymmetry
not on specific individuals, but rather on relative income rankings. This ranking provides
the concavity of the utility function with respect to income. The higher the income in the
ranking, the less social weight it has. At the same time, equation (12) is linear in average
income. As such, SWG is relatively more sensitive to mean income than SWA and less
sensitive to inequality.
3 Inequality and trade in general equilibrium
To explore the interaction between production, trade and trade policy, and inequality, we
work with a modified dual representation of trade in general equilibrium (Dixit and Norman,
1980). To do so, we first adopt the following additional set of assumptions:
• Rational behavior by households and firms.
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• Complete and perfectly competitive markets.
• Convex technology, with neoclassical production functions.
• Goods are tradable and factors are not.
• Every household has the same neoclassical technology for producing the composite
consumption good.
Given these assumptions, we are able to define the core general equilibrium system for
demand and production in terms of expenditure and revenue functions, with expenditure
defined in terms of the composite consumption good. Social welfare then follows as a set of
side equations from the core general equilibrium system.
3.1 The core general equilibrium system
Because we assume that all households have the same consumption technology defined with
respect to the composite consumption good, we can drop the household index from con-
sumption and represent aggregate expenditure as a function of aggregate consumption and
prices:
e (p, c) = c · f (p) (13)
On the production side, we assume standard neoclassical production functions with con-
stant returns to scale: xi = gi (vij), where gi (·) is the production function for good i and
vji is the use of factor j in the production of good i. Defining unit input coefficients as aji
we also obtain: 1 ≤ gi (aji). Endowment constraints are then
∑
ajixi ≤ vj . From these
conditions, we can define the economy-wide revenue function with respect to goods prices
and endowments. This is represented in equation (14).
r (p, v) = max
xi,aji
{∑
i
pixi |
∑
i
ajixi ≤ vj and 1 ≤ gi (aji) ∀i, j
}
(14)
From the envelope theorem and the properties of the revenue function r, factor incomes
and goods production can be expressed in terms of the value of the partial derivatives of the
revenue function, evaluated at the equilibrium set of prices:
∂r (p, v)
∂vj
= wj = wj (p, v) ∀j (15)
∂r (p, v)
∂pi
= xi = xi (p, v) ∀i (16)
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Taking equations (15) and (16) in conjunction with equations (13) and (14), we can write
the general equilibrium system for production, consumption, and trade as follows:7
chf (p) =
∑
j
wj (p, v) · vhj
+ ωhτ τm ∀h (17)
m =
∑
h
ch · f (p)− x (p, v) (18)
e (p, c) =
∑
h
∑
j
wj (p, v) · vhj
+ ωhτ τm
 (19)
p = P ∗ + τ = 1 + τ (20)
In equations (17) − (20), we have assumed the home country imposes a tariff of τ on
imports from the rest of the world, while world prices are normalized to one. In addition, ωht
is the household share of the tariff revenue and vhj is the household ownership share of factor
j. In the first equation, household consumption is equal to the household budget. Equation
(18) defines imports on which tariff revenue is generated and equation (19) sets economy
wide expenditure equal to national income. Together, the system of four equations has an
equally dimensioned set of unknowns: ch,m, e and p.
3.2 Household inequality
As explained earlier, the recent literature on trade and the distribution of income has focused
on the functional distribution of income. The functional distribution of income is also an
important building block here for the representation of the household distribution of income.
In equation (21) we define factor incomes s, which follow directly from the endowment stock
and the properties of the revenue function.
sj = rvj (p, v) · vj = wjvj (21)
Thus, the functional distribution of income is a function of equilibrium prices, prefer-
ences, the production technology and the endowment set. In reduced form, the functional
distribution of income F (s) is then an artefact of the equilibrium matching of preference and
the technology set, given our endowment vector.
F (s) = F (p, v) (22)
7A two-country general equilibrium system can readily be formalized using the same framework.
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Using factor incomes wj and the household ownership share of production factors, ωhj we
can readily obtain household income. In addition, we include the assignment of import tariff
revenue, again represented by a household share parameter. Equation (23) presents the basic
definition of household income in terms of its primary components.
yh =
∑
j
wj · vj · ωhj
+ ωhτ τm (23)
ch =
yh
pc
(24)
where 1 ≥ ωh ≥ 0 and ∑ωhj =∑ωhτ = 1. In reduced form, the personal distribution of
income F (y) is a consequence of the elements affecting the functional distribution and the
h× j ownership matrix of coefficients ωhj , represented by Ω:
F (y) = F (p, v,Ω) (25)
Note that social welfare is ultimately a function of the ownership matrix in the econ-
omy, while the impact of trade policy will then depend on the interaction of the underlying
economic structure and the ownership matrix.
3.3 Inequality indexes with system fundamentals
We can write our social metrics of the distribution of income –the Atkinson and Gini indexes–
in terms of system fundamentals. Making a substitution from (23) into (9) and (11), we
obtain the following equations:
IA = 1−
 1n
∑
h
n
(∑
j wjvjω
h
j
)
+ nωhτ τm
y
1−θ

1
1−θ
IA = 1−
n−θ
∑
h
n−1 +∑
j
βj
(
ωhj − n−1
)1−θ

1
1−θ
(26)
IG = 1 +
1
n
− 2
n2
∑
h
h
n
(∑
j wjvjω
h
j
)
+ nωhτ τm
y

IG = 1 +
1
n
− 2
n
∑
h
h
n−1 +∑
j
βj
(
ωhj − n−1
) (27)
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where βj =
wjvj
y represents the national income share of factor and
∑
j βj +
τm
y = 1. In
what follows, we apply the additional normalization that each household receives an equal
share of the tariff revenues, so that ωhτ = n
−1.8
The ratio of the household’s income to per capita income, which accounts for income
dispersion, is given by the sum of the differences between the actual ownership share of
factors and equal shares for each household. From equations (26) and (27), we can make a
substitution back into equations (10) and (12), yielding social welfare itself as a function of
system fundamentals.
SWA =
[
y
pc
(1− IA)
]1−θ
SWA =
(
y
pc
)1−θ
n−θ
∑
h
n−1 +∑
j
βj
(
ωhj − n−1
)1−θ (28)
SWG =
y
pc
(1− IG)
SWG =
(
y
pc
) 2n∑
h
h
n−1 +∑
j
βj
(
ωhj − n−1
)− n−1
 (29)
4 Trade policy, distribution, and welfare
4.1 Generalized effects
From equations (28) and (29) above, social welfare is a function of the first two moments of
the household distribution of income. This is especially obvious with the Atkinson index, as
it is actually the weighted variance of income, with inverse income weights, that provides the
variance component of the social welfare function.9 Because the contributions of the mean
and variance components of income to social welfare are separable in equations (28) and (29),
we can decompose the impact of trade policy as well into its impact on per-capita income (an
efficiency effect), and its impact on the variance of income (a distributional effect). Together,
they determine the overall social welfare impact. Formally, differentiating equations (28) and
(29) with respect to tariffs, we obtain the following equations:
8The distributional impact of tariff revenues can be substantial. This is the emphasis of the paper by
Galor (1994), which includes tariffs in his general equilibrium Overlapping-Generations model.
9While the functional form is different, the social welfare function underlying other income distribution
indexes yields a similar result, though with different weights in the variance component of the welfare function.
The CRRA function yields a particularly clear and parsimonious reduced form.
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∂SWA
∂τ
= (1− θ)
[
y
pc
(1− IA)
]−θ
(1− IA)1−θ
(
∂y
∂τ
− ∂pc
∂τ
y
p2c
)
− (1− θ)
(
y
pc
)1−θ
I−θA
∂IA
∂τ
(30)
∂SWG
∂τ
= (1− IG)
[
∂y
∂τ
− ∂pc
∂τ
y
p2c
]
−
(
y
pc
)
∂IG
∂τ
(31)
How do we interpret equations (30) and (31)? The efficiency component is well known
(see for example Dixit and Norman, 1980), and is shown here in equation (32). Basically, the
impact of the tariff on per-capita income will depend on the combination of terms-of-trade
and allocation effects (the first set of terms in square brackets in equation (32)), and tariff
revenue (the second set of terms).
∂y
∂τ
=
1
n
∑
h
∂yh
∂τ
=
1
n
[
m
(
1− ∂p
∂τ
)
+ τ
∂m
∂τ
]
(32)
For a small country, negative allocation effects outweigh the terms-of-trade effects, so
that the impact of the tariff on mean income is strictly negative. Also, for the small country,
the impact on the cost of living will be to raise prices. As such, the real mean-income effect
will be strictly negative for a small country. With a large country, the combined income and
cost-of-living effect, or in other words the real income effect of the tariff change as represented
by the term in square brackets in the equations (30) and (31) may be positive or negative
depending on the magnitude of terms-of-trade effects.
The impact on household income distribution, the other part of equations (30) and (31),
follows from differentiation of equations (26) and (27). This is shown below:
∂IA
∂τ
= −n −θ1−θ

∑
h
∑
j
βj
(
ωhj − n−1
)
+ n−1
1−θ

θ
1−θ
∑
h

∑
j
βj
(
ωhj − n−1
)
+ n−1
−θ ∑
j
∂βj
∂τ
(
ωhj − n−1
)
 (33)
∂IG
∂τ
= − 2
n
∑
h
h
∑
j
∂βj
∂τ
(
ωhj − n−1
) (34)
Note that we also have an inverse income weighting, by a factor of θ, in equation (33)
applied to induced changes in income. The weighting of induced changes in income for the
Gini index depends on the ranking of individual households on the relative income scale.
11
In both cases, the changes in income in turn depend on Stolper-Samuelson derivatives, and
induced price changes that follow from tariff changes. This is expressed in equation (35),
where the term ∂βj∂τ depends on system fundamentals and Stolper-Samuelson relationships.
∂βj
∂τ
=
∂wj
∂p
∂p
∂τ
vj
y
− ∂y
∂τ
wjvj
y2
(35)
We can also represent the relationship in elasticity terms: εβj ,τ = εwj ,pεp,τ − εy,τ .
4.2 Heckscher-Ohlin inequality effects
Assuming that all households hold a claim on one unit of labour, we can apply equations
(33) and (34) to a two-factor, two-good Heckscher-Ohlin model. In this framework, equations
(36) and (37) determine the impact of tariff changes on household inequality.
∂IA
∂τ
= −n −θ1−θ
{∑
h
[
βk
(
ωhk − n−1
)
+ n−1
]1−θ} θ1−θ
∑
h
{[
βk
(
ωhk − n−1
)
+ n−1
]−θ [∂βk
∂τ
(
ωhk − n−1
)]}
(36)
∂IG
∂τ
= − 2
n
∑
h
h
[
∂βk
∂τ
(
ωhk − n−1
)]
(37)
Inequality is purely a function of the allocation of capital in this model. At the same time,
the impact of the tariff is then a function of which sector is protected. If protection leads
to an increase in wages and a drop in capital income, inequality is reduced. Alternatively, if
capital income is protected, we will see a rise in inequality.
The social welfare effect, however, will depend on the trade-off between real income effects
following from import protection, and the impact on inequality. In other words, the trade-off
between equity and efficiency. From equations (30) and (31), this is ultimately a function of
the degree of inequality aversion, combined with the structural features of the economy and
its market power on world markets. For a small country, real income effects will be strictly
negative, while inequality effects may be positive or negative, depending on the relative
endowment structure of the economy. For a large country, it is possible for both effects to
work in the same direction. However, in this case, note that positive terms-of-trade gains
will slow any rise (or slow any fall) in capital income shares, from equation (35). This in turn
means that terms of trade effects will tend to mitigate the inequality effects of protection.
On the basis of equation (35), (36) and (37), we can summarize our discussion above with
the following observations about import protection and inequality in the 2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin
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model.
Observation 1 In a small labour-abundant Heckscher-Ohlin economy where the poor receive
only or mostly labour income, and where the mean real-income effects of import protection
are negative, the effect of import protection on welfare through mean income is magnified
by the impact through inequality. Because of this magnification effect, net effects remain
unambiguous and negative.
Observation 2 In a small, capital-abundant Heckscher-Ohlin economy, where the poor re-
ceive only or mostly labour income, and where the mean real-income effects of import protec-
tion are negative, the effect of import protection on welfare through mean income is at least
partially offset by the impact through inequality. Hence the net welfare effect is ambiguous. It
depends on the specification and parameterization of the underlying social welfare function.
Observation 3 The impact of protection on inequality as measured by the Atkinson and
Gini indexes will be weaker, in a Heckscher-Ohlin economy, for large countries. This is
because of terms of trade effects from equation (35), which will dampen the goods-price to
factor-price transmission mechanisms at play.
Observation 1 flags a magnification effect, linking efficiency and inequality effects, in
labour abundant economies. In contrast, we instead have an offsetting effect in capital-
abundant economies, as noted in Observation 2. Observation 3 follows because our tariff
analytics are driven by the transmission of tariff changes into price changes, and these are
weaker in larger economies. These smaller internal price effects mean smaller inequality
effects.
4.3 Inequality effects in the 2x3 Ricardo-Viner model
Next, consider the specific factors model. We can make a similar manipulation of equations
(33) and (34), like that yielding equations (36) and (37), for the standard 2-good, 3-factor
model. This yields equations (38) and (39). Again, if we assume that inequality follows from
the ownership pattern of (specific) capital, then in this case a shift in income shares through
protection from more to less concentrated factors (in terms of the concentration of factor
ownership) yields a reduction in inequality. The same points then follow, as before, with
regard to country size and inequality effects in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. Otherwise, the
impact of protection on inequality depends on the pattern of relative wage and ownership
effects.
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∂IA
∂τ
= −n −θ1−θ
{∑
h
[
βk1
(
ωhk1 −
1
n
)
+ βk2
(
ωhk2 −
1
n
)
+
1
n
]1−θ} θ1−θ
∑
h
{[
βk1
(
ωhk1 −
1
n
)
+ βk2
(
ωhk2 −
1
n
)
+
1
n
]−θ
[
∂βk1
∂τ
(
ωhk1 −
1
n
)
+
∂βk2
∂τ
(
ωhk2 −
1
n
)]}
(38)
∂IG
∂τ
= − 2
n
∑
h
h
[
∂βk1
∂τ
(
ωhk1 − n−1
)
+
∂βk2
∂τ
(
ωhk2 − n−1
)]
(39)
We can summarize our results with respect to the Ricardo-Viner model as follows:
Observation 4 In a small Ricardo-Viner country, where any income effects from tariffs
will be negative, protection may still be welfare improving if the induced change in inequality
is large enough. This depends on the assumed functional form and parameterization of the
social welfare function. If inequality is not improved, then the worsening inequality magnifies
the negative efficiency effects.
Observation 5 Unlike the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the impact of protection on inequality as
measured by the Gini or Atkinson index is ambiguous in the Ricardo-Viner model when capital
ownership patterns are the source of inequality. This is because the degree of concentration
of specific-factor ownership (the weights applies in equations (38) and (39) to the induced
changes in the specific-factor share of income) may vary between the two sectors, and because
the impact on capital income will have opposite sign depending on the sector protected.
This last observation associates the impact of protection on inequality to differences in
ownership patterns for specific factors. If the ownership of the import-competing specific
factor is sufficiently less concentrated than that for the export-sector, import protection
will reduce inequality. However, if capital in the import-competing sector has relatively
concentrated ownership, it will make the situation worse. For example, in a developing
country where the poor have labour and land, and the rich labour and capital, protection
will make the concentration of income worse, assuming the sector using capital is an import-
competing sector. On the other hand, if ownership of land is very highly concentrated relative
to capital, import protection may improve the distribution of income.
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5 The Setting of Trade Policy
In this section, we examine the impact of inequality issues on the determination of import
protection in an endogenous tariff model. We focus on the Heckscher-Ohlin model, where
we obtain unambiguous results with respect to the impact of inequality considerations, in
the region of a political equilibrium, on the observed tariff rate. We also discuss, briefly, the
meaning of our results for endogenous tariff formation in a specific-factors model.
5.1 Capital rents
In our 2x2 Hecksher-Ohlin economy, we now assume consumers can be divided between
workers and investors. The latter differentiate themselves by earning capital rents in addition
to their labor earnings. Moreover, we assume that both groups are internally homogeneous
and index them by h = l, k. Thus, we have nk investors and nl workers, each with real
consumption defined as:
cl =
wl + ωlττm
f (p)
(40)
ck =
wl + wkn−1k + ω
k
ττm
f (p)
(41)
Assuming a CRRA utility function as in equation (6) with θ 6= 1, we get:
ul =
1
1− θ
(
wl + ωlττm
f (p)
)1−θ
(42)
uk =
1
1− θ
(
wl + wkn−1k + ω
k
ττm
f (p)
)1−θ
(43)
Introducing a tariff change, the utility of each representative consumer is modified ac-
cording to equations (44) and (45). We assume that each household is entitled to the same
share of tariff revenue: ωlτ = ω
k
τ = n
−1.
∂ul
∂τ
=
(
wl + τmn−1
f (p)
)−θ 1
f (p)[
∂wl
∂τ
+mn−1 +
∂m
∂τ
τn−1 −
(
wl + τmn−1
)
f (p)
∂f (p)
∂τ
]
(44)
∂uk
∂τ
=
(
wl + wkn−1k + τmn
−1
f (p)
)−θ
1
f (p)[
∂wl
∂τ
+
∂wk
∂τ
n−1k +mn
−1 +
∂m
∂τ
τn−1 −
(
wl + wkn−1k + τmn
−1)
f (p)
∂f (p)
∂τ
]
(45)
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Figure 1: Investor rents with respect to tariff levels
In a small open labor-abundant economy, we know from the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
that: ∂wl∂τ < 0,
∂wk
∂τ > 0 and by construction
∂f(p)
∂τ > 0. Therefore, the workers are hurt by the
tariff, both because of the efficiency and the distributional impact of the tariff. We obtain
the optimum tariff for each group by equating (44) and (45) to zero. The workers’ optimum
tariff is zero, since tariffs reduce their share of total income (itself decreasing) and increase
prices. For the investors, equation (46) shows the first order equilibrium condition.
∂wk
∂τ
n−1k +
(
n−1m+
∂m
∂τ
τn−1 − τmn
−1
f (p)
)
=
(
wl + wkn−1k
)
f (p)
∂f (p)
∂τ
− ∂wl
∂τ
r = z (46)
The left hand side term represents investor tariff gains (r) that compensate for the tariff
cost (z), which are shown in the right hand side. Note that these costs are the same as
the net welfare effect (folding in tariff revenues) on workers. While r is a combination of
increased capital earnings and the tariff revenue, z includes the rise in the consumer goods
price and the reduction in labor earnings. Moreover, both components are not monotonically
related to tariffs. In particular, ∂r∂τ < 0 and
∂z
∂τ > 0. We depict the investors’ optimal tariff
in Figure 1 as τ = τ ∗ .
For any given tariff, the net rents are equivalent to the area between both curves. In the
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figure, this is equal to the trapezoid connected by points 1, 2, 3 and 4, when τ = τ1. From
equation (46) the optimum tariff τ∗ for investors is the intersection of r and z. Beyond this
point, the increase in capital rents is offset by the increase in prices and the decrease in wage
earnings.
As a group, investor rents R are given by:
R (τ) = nk
∫
(r − z) dτ (47)
where r and z are defined in equation (46). Moreover, R (τ) > 0, ∂R(τ)∂τ > 0, and
∂2R(τ)
∂τ2 < 0 over the relevant range.
5.2 The government’s maximization problem
At this point, we could invoke a variety of different political economy models to generate
political underpinnings for the setting of an equilibrium tariff in the political marketplace.
These models have been extensively analyzed in the recent literature10, and following Help-
man (1995) we note that many of these can be represented, in reduced form, by the now
standard political support function.
Direct democracy is a rare political mechanism and generally public policies are decided
by representative governments that balance conflicting interests. From Hillman (1989) we
know that when one of the factors is sufficiently concentrated across only a few households,
these individuals can organize to form pressure groups and overcome the free-rider problem.
In such cases, Grossman and Helpman (2002) have demonstrated that in the reduced form the
policy maker has two arguments to consider: the general interest and the interest of special
groups (for example capital owners and unions). The interest of the government can follow
from electoral support when social welfare is increasing and electoral contributions go with
lobbying. For example, in a poor labor-abundant country investors can offer a contribution
ρ (where ρ ≤ R) to induce the policy-maker to increase import protection.
The precise weight the policy maker assigns to each group is established by her political
support function, as in equation (48).
U (τ) = λ1SW (τ) + λ2ρ (τ) (48)
where U is the policy-makers utility, where we assumed that the tariff level is the only
policy instrument of the government. The weights λ characterize the political system (how
10See for example Helpman (1995) and Grossman and Helpman (2002).
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important are the contributions for the electoral campaign) and the policy-makers preferences
(how she values reelection against more contributions).
Conditional on the particular values of these weights, she maximizes her utility by the
first order condition shown in equation (49).
∂U (τ)
∂τ
= λ1
∂SW (τ)
∂τ
+ λ2
∂ρ (τ)
∂τ
= 0 (49)
where ∂SW (τ)∂τ has been already defined in equations (30) and (31) . Since ρ is the fraction
of the capital rents R that are assigned to political contributions, the additional term ∂ρ(τ)∂τ
is directly derived from equation (46). Furthermore, ∂ρ(τ)∂τ > 0 until the optimum tariff for
investors is reached.
The additional element in the political mixture here is the effect of the tariff on social
welfare
(
∂SW (τ)
∂τ
)
, which is not known beforehand. The tariff impact on an inequality-
adjusted social welfare function can induce changes to the standard results of the political
support model. Thus, there is not necessarily a trade-off between both right hand side terms
in equation (48) and in some cases they can reinforce each other.
If we analyze small open economies and consider only the social welfare implications, when
the distributional effect of the tariff compensates for the efficiency losses we observe a positive
optimum tariff rate. From Observation 2, this can be the case only for capital-abundant
countries. On the other hand, from Observation 1, in poor countries the distributional and
efficiency effects reinforce each other and the socially optimum tariff is zero, though the
equilibrium rate may be positive.
When the influence of special interest groups is introduced, the previous partial results
can change. In a rich capital-abundant country, the capital-owners have an incentive to
lower tariffs, and if the workers can organize, they lobby to increase tariffs. The final outcome
depends on the specific rents each group obtains and its political influence. In labor-abundant
countries positive tariffs can be explained by the presence of an effective lobby, and in capital
rich countries they can be explained by equity concerns that partially overcome free trade
lobbying.
These multiple outcomes are summarized in the following observations:
Observation 6 In a Hecksher-Ohlin world, with homogeneous labor owners, concentrated
capital and a policy-maker that cares about equity and assigns no weight to political contri-
butions, the government’s optimum tariff is higher in small capital-abundant countries than
in small labor-abundant countries.
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Observation 7 In a Hecksher-Ohlin capital-abundant economy, with relatively greater in-
equality aversion, while capital owners will lobby for lower tariffs, the government will be
relatively more protectionist because of equity reasons than otherwise. Equity concerns then
offset to some extent pressure for lower tariffs in the political marketplace.
Observation 8 In a Hecksher-Ohlin labor-abundant economy, with relatively greater in-
equality aversion, the government will favor relatively lower tariffs for equity and efficiency
reasons, but will be lobbied by capitalists for higher tariffs. Equity concerns then offset to
some extent pressure for higher tariffs in the political marketplace.
Basically, when the distributional effects are not significant enough to upset the efficiency
losses imposed by the tariff, the common results of the literature emerge and higher tariffs
are directly associated to the weight and the contributions of special interest groups. At the
same time though, in the presence of distributional concerns rich countries tend to impose
higher tariffs than otherwise. Relatively high average tariffs across a subset of capital-rich
countries can then be seen as a consequence of inequality considerations by the policy-
maker, as well as the presence of influential unions. In poor countries positive tariff rates are
a direct consequence of the investor lobby overcoming both equity and efficiency concerns.
In developing countries with a political system that assigns a significantly higher weight to
social welfare than average, tariffs should remain lower than otherwise.
A similar analytical exercise can be carried out with a 2x3 specific-factors model. In
particular, ignoring equity concerns, we have an equilibrium tariff that balances the efficiency
effects of the tariff against the interests of owners of sector 1 and sector 2 capital. However,
unlike the results for the Heckscher-Ohlin model we developed here, we will not then have
unambiguous results when we add inequality to the policy objective mix. This is because,
from Observations 4 and 5, the inequality impact of a tariff may itself be ambiguous. If a
tariff reduces inequality in the region of the political equilibrium, we would again expect the
equity-conscious government to be more protectionist than otherwise. If not, we expect the
opposite to hold.
6 Conclusions
We have explored theoretical linkages between import protection and the household distri-
bution of income. This complements the existing literature that links trade policy to factor
incomes and the functional distribution of income, which is well developed in the literature.
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The main insight of this literature is provided by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and consti-
tutes a first step in our analysis. In a general equilibrium context, tariff changes ultimately
affect the household distribution through variations in ownership patters in conjunction with
Stolper-Samuelson effects. To model ownership structures, we used the Heckscher-Ohlin and
Ricardo-Viner trade models. Within both frameworks, we are then able to produce theoret-
ical predictions between trade protection, country size, level of development, and personal
income inequality.
Another contribution of this paper is that we examine the formal link between social
welfare and the equilibrium determinants of the distribution of income. Using Sen-type social
welfare functions, we decompose the general equilibrium welfare effects of import protection
into real income level and distribution components. The dispersion component is estimated
using Gini and Atkinson inequality indexes. With these explicit inequality derivatives we map
import protection to inequality-adjusted welfare. In addition, when standard trade models
are employed this framework also yields predictions relating social welfare with protection,
country size and levels of development. In conjunction with the relevant inequality index,
the general form of the decomposition of welfare and inequality we develop here may also be
useful in applied general equilibrium applications focused on inequality.
Once the distributional effects of trade liberalization are determined, we can apply en-
dogenous tariff formation models to assess how the optimum tariff is affected by equity
concerns. In representative democratic systems, we find that positive optimum tariffs can
be sustained in capital-abundant countries even when the policy-maker assigns a low or zero
weight to the contributions of special interests groups. In this case, the positive distribu-
tional effect of import protection can offset or compensate the efficiency losses of reduced
trade. In poor countries, characterized by the relative abundance of labor, positive tariffs are
explained by the influence of special interest groups (i.e. capitalists) that heavily lobby for
higher tariffs. Thus, import protection in LDCs not only diminishes social welfare through
efficiency and equity considerations, but also signals the economic and political weight of the
capital-owners.
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